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Invisible Error
When trial becomes a luxury, retrial can start to look downright decadent. Scholars
have documented the “vanishing trial” in recent decades, exploring the various causes
and effects of declining trial rates. Retrial, if mentioned at all, is portrayed as a
relatively inefficient vehicle for error correction at best. At worst, it is seen as a threat to
the sanctity of the ever‐rarer jury verdict.
But the jury trial is only endangered, not yet extinct. And continuing to protect the
constitutional right to a jury requires appreciating the role of retrial within the due‐
process framework. When the jury’s verdict contradicts the great weight of the evidence,
the trial judge is authorized to set aside that verdict and order a new trial. This power,
sometimes called the “thirteenth juror” rule, dates back to the Blackstonian era. It exists
in both civil and criminal cases, in both state and federal court. Over time, however, the
trial court’s power to review the weight of the evidence has fallen into a state of
doctrinal disorder and inconsistency.
This Article argues that the judge’s ability to order a new trial on the weight of the
evidence should be understood as a safeguard against invisible error. Invisible error
arises when improper jury decision making hides behind the shroud of rules protecting
the jury’s deliberative secrecy. Invisible error can be caused either by the jury’s
innocent misunderstanding (of the court’s instruction or of an attorney’s presentation
of evidence) or by more egregious juror misconduct or undisclosed bias. The attorneys
and the court see only the result of the jury’s decision making, not the erroneous
procedure that led to that result. The possibility of such error, however, is no reason to
jettison the jury altogether. The jury has strengths that cannot be matched by judges
alone, including the power of group decision making, a greater diversity in its members,
and a more accurate reflection of the community. Judges, by contrast, possess greater
experience with a range of cases and a better understanding of how the facts and the law
interrelate in the case.
The judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence complements the jury’s role and
protects the integrity of the trial process. Even when the judge cannot identify a
particular process error, the judge may have an intuitive sense that a jury has gone
astray. Weight‐of‐the‐evidence review protects both of these complementary roles: the
jury is given the independence to allow full, free, and confidential deliberation, while
the judge is permitted to exercise the discretion gained from experience to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. Even in the era of the endangered jury and vanishing trial,
judges should embrace their power to order a new trial when justice demands it.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

First year law students learn that there are two primary bases on which a
losing party can request a new trial: process errors, such as erroneously
admitted evidence or improper attorney argument, and weight‐of‐the‐
evidence points, where the trial judge concludes that the evidence at trial
weighed strongly against the jury’s verdict.1 This article argues that those
seemingly different grounds for retrial are really two sides of the same
problem. What we think of as “weight of the evidence” review is also an
attempt to correct for process errors.
But unlike typical process errors that can be raised by the attorney and
corrected through ordinary trial and appeal mechanisms, invisible error
arises when improper jury decision making hides behind the shroud of
rules protecting the jury’s deliberative secrecy. Invisible error may arise
from the ordinary failures of communication between the court and
members of the jury—an innocent misunderstanding—or it may arise



Professor of Law, Laura B. Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, and Director of the
Center for Professional Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to
Sharona Hoffman, Jacqueline Lipton, William Ray, Mike Weston, and participants at the
2016 National Foundation for Judicial Excellence (NFJE) Symposium for valuable
discussions and feedback that contributed to this project.

See, e.g., JOSEPH W. GLANNON, ANDREW M. PERLMAN, & PETER RAVEN‐HANSEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 1106 (2011) (defining “process errors” as errors that “occurred
in the conduct of trial or the jury’s deliberations” and “weight‐of‐the evidence errors” as
cases in which the judge finds the jury’s verdict to be “clearly wrong” and unsupported
by the evidence). The casebook authors call Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 “coyly
unhelpful,” in revealing the proper grounds for a new trial, as the rule provides broadly
that a new trial may be ordered “after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.“ Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
59).
1
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from more egregious juror misbehavior or undisclosed bias. In some
cases, it may even arise at a subconscious level, as when the court
instructs the jury to disregard trial testimony but the jurors are unable to
forget what they have heard.2 Because these errors are invisible to both
the judge and to the lawyers who could otherwise object, they are
correctable only indirectly through the grant of a new trial on the weight
of the evidence.
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court shows the danger
of invisible error,3 offering what Justice Kagan referred to as “the best
smoking‐gun evidence you’re ever going to see about race bias in the jury
room.”4 The underlying case dealt with a contested eyewitness
identification. Two teenagers, daughters of a horse‐racing jockey, were
subjected to harassment and were groped in a racetrack bathroom.5 After
they reported the assault to their father, he connected their description of
the assailant to racetrack worker Miguel Peña‐Rodriguez, and the girls
later identified the worker to police.6 A coworker provided alibi
testimony, asserting that Peña‐Rodriguez was with him elsewhere at the

22 Similar to how the admonition “Don’t think about an elephant!” typically backfires,
jurors may be unable to put such information aside when they begin deliberations. United
States v. Moreno, 991 F.2d 943, 951 (1st Cir. 1993) (“In fact, juries are even more likely to
consider such evidence if admonished by the court not to consider it, than if no specific
instruction is given.”); SAUL KASSIN AND LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 108–09 (1988); Meir Dan‐Cohen, Skirmishes on the
Temporal Boundaries of States, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2009, at 95, 100 (“[D]eliberate
attempts at forgetting are notoriously counterproductive (“donʹt think about an
elephant”) and precarious, easily reversible by anyone who cares to provide a reminder.”)
3

Peña‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017).

Pena‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513, Transcript of Oral Argument at 44,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15‐
606_5iel.pdf (Oct. 11, 2016).
4

5

Amended Opening Brief, Peña‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 2013 WL 12140027 at 1.

6

Id.
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time the assault occurred.7 Nonetheless, Peña‐Rodriguez was charged
with unlawful sexual contact and was convicted at trial.8
After the verdict was final, Peña‐Rodriguez learned that a juror
had stated during deliberations that he “believed that [the defendant]
was guilty because in his experience as an ex‐law enforcement officer,
Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do
whatever they wanted with women.”9 On appeal, both sides agreed that
the juror’s statement erroneously injected racial bias into the jury’s
decision making. However, evidentiary prohibitions against jurors
impeaching their own verdict prevented the defendant from seeking
relief from the discriminatory verdict.10 All parties acknowledged that
some injustice necessarily arises from the combination of deliberative
secrecy and a rule forbidding jurors from later impeaching their verdicts,
as cases involving jury misunderstanding or misconduct will go
unremedied. But the question before the Court was whether that no‐
impeachment rule violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair
trial.
In a 5‐3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
provided a remedy to the petitioner. The Court acknowledged that the
Colorado rules of evidence—like the federal rules—contain a strict no‐
impeachment rule that extends even to factual testimony about the jury’s
deliberation.11 Nevertheless, the Court held this no‐impeachment rule
violated Peña‐Rodriguez’s constitutional right to an impartial jury and it
remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court specified that such
a remedy was available only to remedy a case of “overt racial bias that
cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the juryʹs

7

Id.

8

Id.

Pena‐Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31, ¶ 6, 350 P.3d 287, 289, reh’g denied (June 15,
2015), cert. granted sub nom. Pena‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513, 194 L. Ed. 2d
602 (2016), withdrawn from bound volume (Apr. 15, 2016).

9

10

Id; FED. R. EVID. 606(b).

11

Pena‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017)
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deliberations and resulting verdict” and further required the racial
animus have been “as significant motivating factor” in the juror’s vote.12
At the same time, the Court distinguished other cases where the no‐
impeachment rule would prevail (including other types of juror bias and
misconduct), holding that that although such cases were “troubling and
unacceptable,” they did not represent the same systemic threat to the
justice system as a whole, but instead “involved anomalous behavior
from a single jury—or juror—gone off course.”13
Thus, although Peña‐Rodriguez was able to obtain a remedy, his
case shows the risk of hidden bias and misconduct. First, although the
Court grants relief for “overt” racial bias that ultimately came to light
after the trial, it cannot remedy covert bias. It is likely that some number
of other jury verdicts are similarly tainted, but remain shrouded by
secrecy. Second, although the Court is certainly correct that racial bias is a
uniquely potent threat to judicial legitimacy, any systemic unfairness can
also threaten the administration of justice. And while a single case of
misconduct may be “anomalous behavior,” a series of such cases
represents a more significant problem.
Thus, in spite of the Court’s remedy in Peña‐Rodriguez, the
underlying tension remains: the deliberative process requires protecting
juror privacy and encouraging openness, but those same values of
privacy and openness create room for verdicts to be infected by prejudice,
bias, and misunderstanding. The Peña‐Rodriguez case is unusual (and
therefore potentially remediable) only because information about the
jury’s deliberation was later revealed. In most cases the parties, lawyers,
and judge will never know what happened in the jury room.14 And even
if the biased statements in Peña‐Rodriguez had never come to light, the
case would have been a good candidate for retrial on the weight of the
12

Id.

13

Id.

See Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Jurors will not be able to function
effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post‐trial litigation. In the interest
of protecting the jury system and the citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not
permit any inquiry into the internal deliberations of the jurors.”).

14
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evidence. Because there was direct eyewitness testimony of the
defendant’s guilt, a directed verdict of acquittal would have been
improper—there was legally sufficient evidence to get to a jury because it
is well within the jury’s purview to credit the victim’s testimony. But
because that evidence was relatively weak—research has shown
eyewitness testimony to be often unreliable, after all, and the victim’s
testimony was rebutted by an alibi witness with no motive to lie15—the
judge could well have found that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the
great weight of the evidence. It is not clear, however, whether such an
argument was pursued in the trial court; on appeal, the defendant
appeared to focus solely on the later‐revealed racial bias.16
The Supreme Court has identified a number of procedural
safeguards to ensure that the jury competently performs its role,
including active pretrial questioning and jurors’ ability to report
problems prior to reaching a verdict.17 And for the most part, these
safeguards work. Studies have found that the judge would have reached
the same verdict as the jury in approximately four out of every five
cases.18 Nonetheless, we know that there is a subset of cases in which the
process goes off track. Researchers authorized to record jury deliberations
found that “[e]ven with the camera rolling, jurors compromised on
verdicts, allowed personality conflicts to interfere with the deliberations,
and oversimplified the judge’s instructions.”19

15 There was additional evidence of bias in the jury’s evaluation of the witness’s testimony;
one juror found the witness to be less credible because he was, in the juror’s words, “an
illegal.”

See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Miguel PENA‐RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondent., 2013 WL 12140027 (Colo.) (arguing for
reversal based on racial bias).
16

Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (noting that such safeguards include (1)
voir dire; (2) juror observation “by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel”; (3)
jurors’ ability to “report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a
verdict”; and (4) post‐verdict impeachment not nonjurors).
17

18

Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 148‐51 (2007).

Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury
Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (2005).

19
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The trial judge’s power to evaluate the weight of the evidence and
to order a retrial helps to fill the gap created when deliberative secrecy
and post‐verdict anti‐impeachment rules conceal the presence of what
would otherwise be reversible error. Even when the judge cannot identify
a particular process error, he or she may have an intuitive sense that a
jury has gone astray.20 Ordering a new trial on the weight of the evidence
thereby allows for the correction of biased or mistaken verdicts even
when jury‐room secrecy prevents the judge from knowing the source of
that injustice.
Judicial power to order a new trial on the weight of the evidence
exists in both civil and criminal cases and in both state and federal court.21
Different jurisdictions refer to the trial judge’s review of evidentiary
weight by different names: in some states it is called the judge’s power to
act as a “thirteenth juror,”22 while other states refer to it as the power to

This sense is likely to arise in a subset of the 20% of the cases where the judge disagrees
with the jury’s verdict. See Vidmar & Hans, supra note 18, at 148‐51 (describing the rate of
disagreement). In many cases where the judge and jury disagree, it is easy to characterize
the result as merely a case where reasonable minds can disagree. But in other cases,
although there is sufficient evidence to support the ultimate result, the jury’s verdict may
be so strongly against the overall weight of the evidence that the judge is convinced that a
miscarriage of justice has occurred. It is this subset of cases where the judge may suspect
that the jury’s finding is based on something other than a thorough analysis of the
evidence. See Hilborn v. Metropolitan Group Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 F.R.D. 651 (D.
Idaho 2015) (awarding a new trial on the weight of the evidence in an insurance coverage
case; the jury found that the insured husband had conspired with his wife to willfully
misrepresent relevant facts on the insurance application, but the judge was convinced
after seeing the husband’s trial testimony that he was “a man of limited cognitive
abilities” who “evidenced a less than complete understanding of the process for
submitting an insurance claim and the court proceedings” and thus the evidence weighed
strongly against finding a willful misrepresentation).
20

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 162 (2008)
(nothing that the procedure applies in both civil and criminal cases, and that state courts
tend to depend upon the remedy more than federal courts, though both include it in the
trial judge’s power).
21

Norton v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 567 S.E.2d 851, 854 (S.C. 2002) (“South Carolina’s
thirteenth juror doctrine is so named because it entitles the trial judge to sit, in essence, as
the thirteenth juror when he finds “the evidence does not justify the verdict,” and then to
grant a new trial based solely “upon the facts.”).
22
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review the “manifest weight”23 or “factual sufficiency”24 of the evidence.25
Federal courts generally refer to it as “weight of the evidence” review.26
But by whatever name it is known, it is a long‐running power, recognized
at common law in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England and
integrated into state and federal practice at the time of the founding of the
United States.27
Over the last century, however, the trial court’s power to review
the weight of the evidence has fallen into a state of doctrinal disorder and
inconsistency, becoming an afterthought (at best) in the trial process.28 At
the same time, trials themselves have become less common. The use of
alternative dispute resolution and a more managerial style among judges

See, e.g., Eastley v. Volkman, 972 N.E.2d 517, 523 (Ohio 2012) (“[E]ven if a trial court
judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence, an appellate court may nevertheless
conclude that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”).

23

Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 622 (Tex. 2004) (“Under traditional factual
sufficiency standards, a court determines if a finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or
clearly demonstrates bias.”).
24

Of course, the various state and federal doctrines are not identical. Norton v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 567 S.E.2d at 854 (“Although the state and federal standards use some similar
language, we do not believe the standards, compared on the whole, are “substantially
similar,” or similar enough to be used interchangeably.”). Nevertheless, they share a
commonality: the trial judge’s power to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence.
25

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433, (1996) (“‘The trial judge in the
federal system,’ we have reaffirmed, ‘has ... discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict
appears to [the judge] to be against the weight of the evidence.’”) (quoting Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Co‐op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958)).

26

3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 387 (1768) (“[I]f it appears
by the judge’s report, certified to the court, that the jury have brought in a verdict without
or contrary to evidence, so that he is reasonably dissatisfied therewith; or if they have
given exorbitant damages; or if the judge himself has misdirected the jury, so that they
found an unjustifiable verdict; for these, and other reasons of the like kind, it is the
practice of the court to award a new, or second, trial”). Blackstone noted that if two juries
agreed, however, then a third trial should not be granted. The presumption against a third
trial likewise carries over into modern practice. See, e.g., Eastley v. Volkman, 972 N.E.2d
517, 526 (Ohio 2012) (noting than an appellate court may reverse “only once on manifest
weight of the evidence”).
27

28

See infra Parts II and III.
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encourage pretrial settlement, and an increased reliance on summary
judgment (in civil cases) and plea bargaining (in criminal cases) divert
even more cases away from trial.29 As trials declined, so too did the
number of cases decided by a jury.30
These two trends may be causally interrelated: as trials became
less common, it makes sense that courts would grow reluctant to order a
second trial on the weight of the evidence. After all, if one trial is a
luxury, then two trials would appear unaffordably decadent. In addition,
judges may unconsciously respond to the rarity of jury trials by
attempting to protect the remaining jury verdicts against encroachment
from the bench—a fear of “invading the province of the jury.”31
But regardless of the reason for it, it is clear that the trial judge’s
power to review evidentiary weight remains significantly undervalued in
in the contemporary era of the vanishing trial. In the federal courts,
litigants often fail to raise weight‐of‐the‐evidence challenges.32 Even when
the parties do challenge the weight of the evidence, the courts often apply

See infra Part IV; see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93
VA. L. REV. 139, 179 (2007) (arguing that the growth of summary judgment contradicts the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We
Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753,
760 (1998) (describing the “rise in plea bargaining”).
29

See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 2 (2016) (noting that , in
federal court, the percentage of criminal cases tried by jury declined from 8.2% in 1962 to
3.6% in 2013, and the percentage of civil cases tried by jury declines from 5.5% in 1962 to
0.8% in 2013`)
30

See Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We invade
the province of the jury only ‘if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence,
is based upon false or pernicious evidence or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’”);
Michael Seward, The Sufficiency‐Weight Distinction ‐ A Matter of Life or Death, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 147, 161 (1983) (“When ruling that a verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence, the
judge does not invade the province of the jury; he simply transfers the defendant from the
province of an unfair or inept jury to the province of a new jury.”).
31

Robertson, supra note 21, at 170; see also, e.g., Morfiah v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15‐
2139, 2016 WL 4151209, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2016) (finding that a litigant had waived the
opportunity to seek a new trial on the weight of the evidence by failing to raise it in the
trial court).
32
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inconsistent standards in ruling on the motion, sometimes conflating the
standard for a new trial with the standard for judgment as a matter of
law.33 In the state courts, both litigants and judges tend to have greater
experience with weight‐of‐the‐evidence review, and the standards are
more likely to be applied consistently within a given state.34 However,
there is significant variation in the standards applied by different states,
and there are still occasions where courts seem to confuse the standard
for a directed verdict (based on insufficient evidence) with the standard
for a new trial (based on the weight of the evidence, not on its
sufficiency).35
This Article argues in favor of a greater recognition of the trial
judge’s power to review the evidentiary weight and to order a new trial
when the jury’s verdict contradicts the great weight of the evidence.
Following this introduction, Part II traces the doctrinal variations in the
trial judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence. It looks at
conflicting precedent in three areas: how strongly the evidence must
contradict the verdict; whether the trial judge should view the evidence
neutrally or more favorably to the verdict winner; and whether the trial
judge can independently assess witness credibility. It further considers
the underlying source of these doctrinal variations: to what extent are the
courts consciously diverging from one another versus mistakenly
applying different standards? When there is little judicial attention given
to the varying standards, it becomes very hard to tell the difference.
Part III explores the procedural forces that led to the doctrinal
divergence and confusion. Normally, the process of appellate review
See infra Part II; see also Robertson, supra note 21, at 170 (noting that the federal courts
ruled on sufficiency points approximately ten times as often as weight points, which
“suggests that attorneys are appealing sufficiency points far more often than weight
points,” but concluding that “if the attorneys think that there is insufficient evidence to
support the verdict, they would presumably also have a strong argument that the verdict
goes against the great weight of the evidence”).
33

34

See infra Part II.

See infra Part II; see also Robertson, supra note 21, at 172 (“Courts have treated such
arguments instead as sufficiency points, seeming to ignore their own precedent about the
difference between weight and sufficiency.”).
35
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promotes the standardization of procedural application within a single
jurisdiction, and the “gravitational force” of federal law promotes
consistency (though not uniformity) between state and federal practice.36
However, due to a historical quirk, the federal circuit courts of appeals
did not begin widely reviewing trial judge rulings on the weight of the
evidence until the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Gasperini v. Center for
the Humanities.37 As a result, the new‐trial remedy largely escaped the
traditional forces that promote procedural standardization.
Part IV then examines how—and why—the trial judge’s power to
act as a thirteenth juror should be safeguarded even in the era of the
vanishing trial. I argue that the judge’s power to review the weight of the
evidence improves decisional accuracy by ensuring that the evidence as a
whole is not just legally sufficient, but is also strong enough to allow the
factfinders to have confidence in the ultimate verdict. Furthermore, the
trial judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence protects the
deliberative process itself, guarding against the risk that the jury’s
deliberations might be infected by bias, prejudice, or any other non‐
evidentiary basis for decision making. Finally, I consider whether the
review of evidentiary weight is protected by the constitutional guarantee
of due process, and I conclude that it should be.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT: CONFUSION,
VARIATION, AND DISAGREEMENT

When invisible error within the jury process leads to a fundamentally
unjust verdict, trial judges have the power to overturn that verdict and
order a new trial. This power to re‐weigh the evidence has a long
pedigree. By the time of the 1768 publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England, it was already well established that the judge could

Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 706 (2016)
(“[F]ederal law exerts a widespread gravitational pull on state actors “); Cassandra Burke
Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2013) (explaining that the
appellate system serves to “increase[e] uniformity and standardization in the application
of legal rules”).

36

37

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996).
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and should grant a new trial if convinced that the jury’s verdict was
contrary to the “clear weight” of the evidence.38 This responsibility—often
known as the “thirteenth juror”39 rule—was incorporated into the early
common law of the original colonies, and subsequently became part of
both state and federal procedure throughout the United States. By 1899,
the Supreme Court recognized that the judge’s power to set aside a jury
verdict as against the weight of the evidence was an essential safeguard
of the jury‐trial process:
‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at
the common law and in the American constitutions, is not
merely a trial by a jury of 12 men before an officer vested with
authority to cause them to be summoned and impaneled, to
administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and
to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but it
is a trial by a jury of 12 men in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on
the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on
acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his
opinion, it is against the law or the evidence.40
This power has continued into the modern era, as trial judges may
exercise the authority to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence in
both criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, of course, the review is
one‐sided: if the jury votes to acquit the defendant, then double jeopardy
prevents further review.41 Only when the jury votes to convict does the
trial judge’s responsibility come into play, and then the judge must
William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1719
(2001) (“The power of trial judges to grant new trials because verdicts or particular jury
findings are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence is universally recognized and
supported by ample common law precedent.”) (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 387 (1768)).
38

Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 45 (1981) (“Whether a state trial judge in a jury trial
may assess evidence as a “13th juror” is a question of state law.”).
39

40

Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1899) (emphasis added).

Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (acknowledging “the unreviewable power of a
jury to return a verdict of not guilty [even] for impermissible reasons”).
41
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normally make two findings: first, whether there was sufficient evidence
to support the conviction (that is, was there sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty), and second, even if the evidence is sufficient such
that a reasonable juror could potentially find the defendant guilty, does
the overall weight of the evidence support that finding?42 If the judge
concludes that the evidence is legally insufficient, then the remedy is
acquittal.43 If, on the other hand, “the court concludes that, despite the
abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence
preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious
miscarriage of justice may have occurred,” then the court “may set aside
the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by
another jury.”44
In civil cases, the trial judge’s review of the weight of the evidence
is more balanced. Regardless of whether the jury’s verdict favored the
plaintiff or defendant, the judge can award a new trial upon finding that
the weight of the evidence preponderated heavily in the opposite
direction.45 In civil cases, this power allows the judge to consider the
overall amount of the verdict as well and to suggest a remittitur if the
damage award is “entirely disproportionate” to the injury.46

People v. Danielson, 880 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2007) (nothing that the judge should decide
“[b]ased on the weight of the credible evidence . . . whether the jury was justified in
finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
42

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, (1978) (“Since we hold today that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence
legally insufficient, the only “just” remedy available for that court is the direction of a
judgment of acquittal.”).
43

44

United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).

11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2806 (3d ed.
2016) (“On a motion for a new trial—unlike a motion for a judgment as a matter of law—
the judge may set aside the verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support
it.”).
45

MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 59.13[2] [f] & [g] (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2010); see also Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy‐Enhancing Benefits of Erie Formalism, 44
AKRON L. REV. 907, 975 & n.202 (2011) (noting that “anyone who has ever practiced in
federal court knows that a jury verdict is in great danger of being set aside as against the
46
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Thus, in both state and federal courts, and in civil and criminal cases,
trial judges have long possessed the power to grant a new trial when the
jury’s findings run counter to “the clear weight of the evidence.”47 In spite
of the long history of this practice and its near‐universal adoption,
however, the standards by judges weigh the evidence and determine
when to grant a new trial are chaotic and inconsistent.48
In this Section, I explore the various standards applied in different
state and federal courts, seeking to tease out the varying approaches.
Courts rarely address these varying approaches explicitly. Their opinions
tend to fall within three different categories. The first—but rarest—
category is “open disagreement,” where courts explicitly disagree with
one another, intentionally and explicitly applying different standards. In
the second category, “implicit doctrinal variation,” different courts and
circuits apply different standards without acknowledging that they are
doing so.49 These differences may either stem from confusion or they may
be fully intentional, but because they remain latent in the court’s holding
they often fall below the radar of advocates or reviewing courts that
might otherwise seek greater standardization.50 Finally, the third category
is one of “doctrinal confusion”; that is, where the same courts, or the
weight of the evidence if the presiding federal trial judge views the amount awarded as
unreasonable,” and pointing out the same logic applies “to review of verdict size as well
as verdict direction”).
William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1719
(2001) (“The power of trial judges to grant new trials because verdicts or particular jury
findings are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence is universally recognized and
supported by ample common law precedent.”).
47

WRIGHT et al., supra note 45, at § 2806 (“The power of a federal judge to grant a new trial
on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is clear. The
standard that is to control in passing on motions of this kind is not.”).
48

See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta‐Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1076 (2009) (discussing
how a judicial philosophy of minimalism can give rise to generalist, non‐detail‐specific
opinions and thus “allows people with diverse doctrinal preferences to bury their
differences and compromise”).
49

See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1889, 1903 (2015) (explaining that “the existing doctrinal landscape . . . often
reflects valuable normative choices, even if implicit and sometimes imperfectly executed”)
50
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same circuits, apply inconsistent standards without realizing that they are
doing so, based on an underlying “lack of conceptual clarity.”51 The
boundaries between these three categories are necessarily indistinct and
mutable. Thus, for example, implicit doctrinal variation may stem either
from underlying confusion and misunderstanding of existing doctrine or
from an intentional (though not explicit) decision to apply a differing
standard.52
A. How Strongly Must the Evidence Contradict the Verdict?
One area of significant disagreement is the degree of injustice the judge
must find before ordering a new trial. That is, how heavily must the
evidence weigh against the jury’s verdict, and how strongly convinced
must the judge be that the jury erred? On this question, court decisions
appear to fall primarily within the category of “implicit doctrinal
variation,” as courts apply different standards without explicitly
acknowledging the variation, only rarely acknowledging any differences.
In some of these “implicit variation” cases, courts will articulate the same
overall standard of review, but will then apply it so differently that an
inconsistent result is achieved even while the same standard is ostensibly
used.
In theory, therefore, the federal circuits should be applying the
same test—or at least should be applying the same test within the broad
categories of civil or criminal cases. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow the judge to grant a new trial “after a jury trial, for any reason for
which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in
federal court,”53 and that rule has been held to include situations in which
“the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision‐Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA.
L. REV. 67, 124 (2012) (describing similar confusion in the intellectual‐property context,
and explaining that “[t]he doctrinal confusion reflects a lack of conceptual clarity about
the conduct that is regulated by” different intellectual property doctrines).
51

See, e.g., Benjamin C. Sassé, Note, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights of
Juveniles, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 698 (2000) (analyzing whether a circuit split over the
right to travel arose from “doctrinal disagreement” or “sloppy rights talk”).
52

53

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
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the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial
error was committed in its course.”54 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure similarly authorize a district judge to grant a new trial when
“the interest if justice so requires.”55 Scholars have explained that
although the text of the rule “does not mention this ground [evidentiary
weight] explicitly . . . courts have long recognized this foundational
reason for a new trial.”56
In practice, however, there is significant variation even in similar
cases. A majority of federal courts appear to require that the judge find
the verdict to be against the “great weight,” “clear weight” or “manifest
weight,” of the evidence.57 Thus, in a close case, where the evidence is
“profuse, somewhat fragmentary, and conflicting in critical areas,” then
the trial judge should not grant a new trial even if he or she ultimately
disagrees with the jury’s conclusion.58 Instead, the courts following this
position have held that jury verdicts should be overturned only “in an
egregious case, to correct a seriously erroneous result, or to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.”59
A minority of federal decisions apply a more lenient standard,
however, allowing the trial judge to exercise unfettered discretion in
ordering a new trial on the weight of the evidence upon mere

54

Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985).

55

FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2016).

56

3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT et al., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 582 (4th ed. 2011).

Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267,
318–19 (2005) (“Such new trial motions, it is traditionally stated, should not be granted by
the trial court unless the verdict is against the ‘great weight of the evidence,’ or the ‘clear
weight of the evidence’) (citing Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir.
1982); Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1980); Taylor v.
Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1979); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940); Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d
849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989)).
57

58

Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1980)

59

Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418–19 (2d Cir. 2012).
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disagreement with the jury’s verdict.60 In a rare case of explicit
acknowledgement of the different standards, the Third Circuit has
pointed to these varying lines of authority without clearly adopting either
of them.61 Scholars have pointed out that these decisions are older and do
not seem consistent with modern trends.62 It may well be that the
standards have shifted over time, slowly restricting the judge’s discretion
to grant a new trial and reallocating authority between judge and jury in
federal court. Nonetheless, because these cases remain in the “implicit
variation” category, it is unclear whether and to what extent this is a
significant shift in authority or merely a change of nomenclature.
State‐court decisions reflect a similar split. Most states apply a rule
similar to the majority of federal courts, allowing a new trial only when
the judge finds the jury’s verdict to be contrary to the “manifest weight”
or the “great weight” of the evidence, or when the jury’s verdict would
result in a “manifest injustice.”63 Like their federal counterparts, they hold
that “[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a
different conclusion.”64

See, e.g., Murphy v. U.S. Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., Southern Division, 145
F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1944); Fortenberry v. New York Life Ins. Co., 459 F.2d 114, 116
(6th Cir. 1972) (upholding the grant of a new trial based on the trial judge’s statement that
he was “not satisfied that the evidence supports the verdict,” and stating that the decision
was “within the discretionary power of the judge”).
60

Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (“What we have stated
demonstrates that there is no consensus of opinion as to the exact standards to be used by
a trial court in granting a new trial and that the criteria to be employed by an appellate
tribunal charged with reviewing the trial judge’s decision in this respect are equally
indefinite.”).
61

Wright, supra note 45, at § 2806 (“The unlimited‐discretion standard, however, seems to
have fallen out of favor with modern courts, as evidenced by its absence from recent
opinions.”).

62

63 See, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer, 262 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio 1970) (holding that a new trial is
appropriate when “it appears to the trial court that a manifest injustice has been done, and
that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence”).
64

Com. v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751‐52 (Pa. 2000).
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In these states there is a high evidentiary threshold for granting a
new trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court, for example, has stated that
“the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional
cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.”65
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that a new trial should be granted
only when “the evidence should be plainly insufficient to warrant the
finding of the jury.”66 The Ohio Supreme Court has gone even further,
holding that in a civil case, as long as there is “some competent, credible
evidence going to all the essential elements of the case,” then the
judgment “will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the
manifest weight of the evidence.”67 An Arizona intermediate court
similarly suggested that a new trial should be denied as long as
“substantial evidence supports the jury verdict,”68 though the Arizona
Supreme Court recently overturned that decision, holding that the “trial
judge has broad discretion . . . to find the verdict inconsistent with the
evidence and grant a new trial, so as to guard against arbitrary
verdicts.”69
Nerveless, the state courts—again, like their federal
counterparts—have split on the question of how much discretion the trial
judge can exercise in granting a new trial. Unlike their federal
counterparts, some states continue to apply a much more lenient
standard even in the modern era. Rhode Island, for example, allows the
trial court to grant a new trial “when it determines that the verdict is
against the fair preponderance of the evidence and fails to do substantial
justice.”70 North Dakota has held that “‘when [the trial judge’s] judgment
65

Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005).

66

Leigh v. Com., 66 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Va. 1951).

67 State v. Wilson, 865 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ohio 2007). The court has applied a broader
standard in criminal cases, concluding that a criminal conviction could be overturned on
the weight of the evidence if the reviewing court concludes that the defendant’s evidence
was “more persuasive” than the state’s. Id.

State v. Fischer, 238 Ariz. 309, 314‐15, 360 P.3d 105, 110‐11 (Ct. App. 2015), as amended
(Oct. 8, 2015), rev’d, State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 392 P.3d 488, 494 (2017).

68

69

State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 392 P.3d 488, 494 (2017).

70

State v. Mondesir, 891 A.2d 856 (R.I. 2006).
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tells him that it is wrong, that, whether from mistake, or prejudice, or
other cause, the jury have erred, and found against the fair
preponderance of the evidence, then no duty is more imperative than that
of setting aside the verdict, and remanding the question to another
jury.’”71 Iowa “allows the court to grant a motion for new trial only if
more evidence supports the alternative verdict as opposed to the verdict
rendered.”72
Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court has emphasized that the trial
judge’s experience should be employed to avoid an “unjust verdict.”73 It
reversed an intermediate court decision that had applied a stricter
standard, holding that “[t]he trial judge’s discretion permits the grant of a
new trial [even when it] is not ‘clear, obvious, and indisputable that the
jury was wrong,’” and that “[t]he fact that there may be substantial,
competent evidence in the record to support the jury verdict does not
necessarily demonstrate that the trial judge abused his or her
discretion.”74
Because the states are separate sovereigns, there is less incentive for
state courts to examine precedent outside their jurisdiction and there is
no reason why individual states should not apply different standards.
Nonetheless, it is striking both that the split among the states reflects a
similar split in the standards applied by federal courts and also that
opinions from both states and federal courts only rarely discuss the
varying standards. It has often been said that the states may perform a
“vital function” as “laboratories of democracy,”75 but that function can
State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 307 (N.D. 1984) (quoting Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Kunkel, 17 Kan. 145, 152 (1876)).
71

72

State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016)

73

Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490, 497 (Fla. 1999).

74

Id.

75 Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673,
192 L. Ed. 2d 704 (2015) (“This Court has ‘long recognized the role of the States as
laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.’”) (quoting Oregon v. Ice,
555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009) and citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”);
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only be served if those laboratories acknowledge that they are, in fact,
applying different standards and record the results of their experiments
with those standards.76
B. In What Light Should the Evidence be Viewed?
There are also conflicting holdings from both state and federal
courts about whether the trial judge should view the evidence in the
“light most favorable” to the verdict in ruling on a motion for a new trial.
Variance on this issue, however, appears to be a clearer case of doctrinal
confusion. In particular, courts requiring the judge to view the evidence
in the “most favorable light” are likely conflating the standard for a
directed verdict with the standard for granting a new trial.77 Certainly, a
court may grant judgment as a matter of law only if, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court determines
that no reasonable juror could have reached the relevant conclusion.78
Thus, if a directed verdict is inappropriate, then there logically must be
some legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s decision would seem to
foreclose the possibility of ever granting a new trial on the weight of the
evidence: if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”)).
76 E.g., Adam Savage, Titanic Survival, MYTHBUSTERS (2012) (“Remember kids, the only
difference between screwing around and science is writing it down.”) (available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSUMBBFjxrY).

11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2806 (3d ed.
2016) § 2806 (not that generally taking the “most favorable view” is not required, but that
“[t]here are erroneous statements to the contrary in a few cases that have confused the
standard on a new‐trial motion with that on a directed‐verdict motion.”).
77

See, e.g., Moore v. Singh, 755 S.E.2d 319, 321 (Ga. App. 2014) (“A directed verdict is
authorized only when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the
evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular
verdict. A grant of directed verdict is a ruling that the evidence and all reasonable
deductions therefrom demand a particular verdict.”).
78
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verdict, then either the court should grant a judgment as a matter of law
or allow the jury’s verdict to stand.79
Nonetheless, there continues to be disagreement. These opposing
views can be seen in the contrasting opinions of the Mississippi Supreme
Court and the Alaska Supreme Court. In Mississippi, the court held that
“the evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the
verdict.”80 In Alaska, by contrast, the court reversed the underlying
judgment because the judge had mistakenly viewed the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict instead of “independently weigh[ing]”
the evidence.81
Federal courts tend to more consistently agree that the trial judge
should weigh the evidence neutrally in ruling on a motion for a new
trial.82 The Fourth Circuit—like the Alaska Supreme Court—has at least
twice reversed trial court judgment that used the “most favorable light”
language.83 Even among the federal circuits, however, there is
occasionally loose language that suggests that the “most favorable light”

79 Robertson, supra note 21, at 187 (“The court’s stated task is to determine if the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict. Thus, if it views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, it is presuming the answer to the very question it seeks to
answer.”).
80

Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005).

Kava v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 48 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Alaska 2002) (“In deciding a motion
for a new trial on this basis, the court must use its discretion and independently weigh the
evidence. A court may set aside a verdict as being against the weight of the evidence even
when ‘there is substantial evidence to support it.’”).
81

Robertson, supra note 21, at 181 (citing Song v. Ives Lab., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir.
1992) (“In contrast to the standard applied in considering a motion for judgment n.o.v., a
trial judge hearing a motion for a new trial is free to weigh the evidence himself and need
not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.”) (citation and internal
quotations omitted); Smith v. Tidewater Marine Towing, 927 F.2d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985); Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co.,
263 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1959); Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1959); Magee
v. General Motors Corp., C.A.3d, 1954, 213 F.2d 899, 900 (3d Cir. 1954)).
82

Id. (citing Gill v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 1985);
Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1959)).
83
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standard should apply even in reviewing a motion for a new trial on the
weight of the evidence.84
C. Can the Trial Judge Independently Assess Witness Credibility?
Finally, courts have also taken different positions about what
evidence the judge should consider in deciding whether the evidence
against the verdict is strong enough to warrant a new trial. Assessing
credibility is, of course, one of the primary functions of the jury—as is the
responsibility to weigh the evidence.85 The vast majority of federal courts
have held that the trial judge may consider witness credibility in
determining whether the great weight of the evidence contradicted the
jury’s verdict.86 The First Circuit has held, for example, that “[t]he trial
judge, upon considering a motion for new trial, may consider the
credibility of the witnesses who had testified and, of course, will consider
the weight of the evidence.”87
Id. (citing Ellsworth v. Tuttle, 148 Fed. Appx. 653, 669‐670 (10th Cir. 2005); Sherman v.
Chrysler Corp., 47 Fed. Appx. 716, 724 (6th Cir. 2002) (not designated for publication);
Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004); Brown v. City of McComb Miss.
Police Dep’t, 84 Fed. Appx. 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2003) (not designated for publication).
84

85 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (“Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of the legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”).
86

Robertson, supra note 21, at 181.

MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 1989). The Second, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have made similar statements.
United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (“On a motion for a new
trial based on the weight of the evidence, the court need not view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. It may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of
the witnesses.”); United States v. Tarango, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2170, 12‐13 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 1999); Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d
1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that, in ruling on a motion for new trial, the district court
“was in a unique position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the
weight which should be accorded their testimony”); United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207,
213 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Air‐Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 190 (9th Cir.
1989) (“The judge can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and need
not view the evidence from the perspective most favorable to the prevailing party in
ruling on a motion for a new trial.”); United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir.1980).
87
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Again, however, there is variation in holdings. Opinions from
both the Third and the Fourth Circuits have overturned district‐court
new‐trial rulings for failing to defer to jury determinations of credibility.88
Neither case went so far as to say that the trial judge could not consider
credibility. Nonetheless, their holdings at least implicitly restrained the
trial judge’s authority to do so. The Third Circuit, for example, concluded
that when “litigation deals with material which is familiar and simple, the
evidence relating to ordinary commercial practices,” the trial court will
abuse its discretion by “substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the jury” on
matters of credibility. Likewise, the Fourth Circuit similarly held that
greater deference should be given to the jury “where the subject matter of
the trial is easily comprehended by a lay jury,” and
“minor
inconsistencies” in a witness’s testimony are not significant enough to
overcome the jury’s decision to find the witness credible.89
States also vary as to whether they allow the trial judge to
independently evaluate witness credibility in determining whether the
jury’s verdict goes against the great weight of the evidence. The majority
view is that judges can (and should) assess witness credibility. Thus, for
example, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a trial judge “must
necessarily” consider witness credibility in evaluating the weight of the
evidence.90 Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the court
“in reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences [and] considers the credibility of witnesses.’”91 Iowa,
Mississippi and Rhode Island both follow the same rule that trial judges
may assess credibility, although, as noted above, the evidentiary standard
Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 91 (3d Cir. 1960); Conner v. Schrader‐
Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 201 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Robertson, supra note 21, at
183.
88

89

Conner v. Schrader‐Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 201 (4th Cir. 2000)

90

Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1988).

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v.
Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983); see also State v. McKnight, 837
N.E.2d 315, 334 (Ohio 2005) (noting that in Ohio, the trial judge may consider witness
credibility in ruling on a motion for new trial based on the manifest weight of the
evidence).
91
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for a new trial appears to be somewhat lower in Iowa and Rhode Island
than in Mississippi.92
Other states, however, restrict the trial judge’s consideration of
credibility. A Texas court conducting a similar review, for example, must
defer to the jury’s credibility determinations as long as those
determinations are not unreasonable.93 And in Illinois, the Supreme Court
has held that a trial court’s decision to set aside a jury verdict should be
reversed because “it is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide
what weight should be given to the witnesses’ testimony.”94 The court
was therefore at least implicitly restricting the trial judge’s authority to
independently assess witness credibility.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINAL DISORDER

The doctrinal confusion described in the prior section hinders the
administration of justice and gives rise to systemic procedural
inequalities. Some of its consequences are obvious: for example, how easy
or difficult it is for a verdict loser to obtain a new trial can vary both by
geographic location and by the choice of federal or state forum.95 Other
consequences of the doctrinal disorder are more covert, but still real:
when the review of evidentiary weight is available only inconsistently, it
loses salience, as courts and litigants alike come to rely on it less.96 But
when a new trial is unavailable to remedy a manifestly unjust jury

State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016); Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 348 (R.I.
2002); Miley v. State, 935 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Miss. 2006) (noting that a new trial is
appropriate when the judge disagrees with the “jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony”
such that an “unconscionable injustice” would result from the verdict).
92

Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004). Texas courts use the term
“factual sufficiency review” to refer to weight‐of‐the‐evidence challenges.
93

94

Redmond v. Socha, 837 N.E.2d 883, 900 (Ill. 2005).

95

See supra Part I.

Robertson, supra note 21, at 172 (“Perhaps because federal courts so rarely apply the
new‐trial remedy on the weight of the evidence, they often overlook the very existence of
such a remedy.”).
96
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verdict, one of two consequences will result: either the unjust jury verdict
will stand, denying the wronged litigant relief altogether, or the court will
take the case away from the jury entirely by granting summary
judgment.97 Both results are problematic.
This Part discusses the evolution of the doctrine in both federal and
state court and explores how and why the normal processes that bend
toward procedural uniformity failed to gain significant convergence in
how judges review the weight of the evidence after a jury verdict. There
are three converging trends that lead to an overall impression of doctrinal
disorder. First, an historical lack of appellate review in the federal court
system meant that there was less standardization and the new‐trial
remedy become underutilized.98 Second, although the states made a much
more robust of use of the new‐trial remedy, the lack of unified federal
approach meant that what Professor Scott Dodson has called the
“gravitational force of federal law”99 could not draw the varying states
closer together, and the different state approaches diverged greatly over
the last two and a half centuries.100 Finally, the changing relationship
between appellate courts and trial courts—especially on matters of trial
judge discretion—has complicated the underlying analysis.101
A. The Historical Lack of Appellate Review in Federal Court
In federal court, weight‐of‐the‐evidence review remains vastly
underutilized as compared to its presence in the state courts. This is likely
due, at least in part, to the historical limitation on appellate oversight in
the federal courts. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court held that
In some cases, the court may rely on summary judgment or judgment as a matter law,
thereby cutting out the jury entirely, rather than applying a lesser standard of review and
granting a new trial on the weight of the evidence. See Robertson, supra note 21, at 181. (“If
the rule authorizing new trials on the weight of the evidence is not to be superfluous, then
the standard for granting a new trial cannot be as strict as the standard for granting
judgment as a matter of law.”).

97

98

See infra Part III.A.

99

Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 752 (2016).

100

See infra Part III.B.

101

See infra Part III.C.
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the Seventh Amendment’s Re‐Examination Clause prevented appellate
courts from reviewing the trial judge’s decision to grant or deny a new
trial on the weight of the evidence.102 As a result, trial judges applied very
different standards to decide whether and when to grant a new trial on
the weight of the evidence.
Ordinarily, appellate review of lower court judgments serves a
standardizing function.103 This is not just a matter of articulating
consistent rules. Instead, appellate courts do more than simply resolve
disputes about the proper rule to be applied; they promote uniformity in
how legal rules are applied to particular factual situations.104 This role is
particularly important in delimiting the scope of the district court’s
discretion.105 Without such a standardizing influence, litigants become
less able to predict the outcome of their cases and their trust in the
judicial system diminishes.106

102

United States v. Laub, 37 U.S. 1, 5 (1838).

Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1219, 1224–25 (2013)
(“Legal scholars have identified a number of different functions that a robust appellate
system serves, including correcting legal and factual errors; encouraging the development
and refinement of legal principles; increasing uniformity and standardization in the
application of legal rules; and promoting respect for the rule of law.”).
103

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 771 (2006);
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The Case for
Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 455 (2012) (“The classic remedy for
inconsistent application of the law is appellate review.”).
104

Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 635, 638 (1971) (explaining that appellate review can help define what types of
discretionary decisions are “decision liberating,” where the judge has full freedom to
decide, and which types of decisions are “review limiting,” where “there may be law
constraining the trial court’s decision, but there will be [almost] no appellate review of
that decision”).
105

See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The Case for
Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 455 (2012) (“When plaintiffs’ access to an
effective remedy is inconsistent, unpredictable, and varies according to seemingly random
geographic districts, parties will lose trust in the system and in the rule of law more
broadly.”).
106
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Without the standardizing effect of appellate review, the historical
insulation of the trial judge’s decision meant that the standards for review
were never clearly articulated. As a result, attorneys and courts alike
often failed to distinguish between weight‐of‐the‐evidence and
sufficiency‐of‐the‐evidence challenges.107 In the absence of clearly
articulated grounds for granting a new trial on the weight of the
evidence, parties often failed to raise the issue in federal court—even
appellees who alleged a complete lack of evidence to support the jury’s
verdict and sought entry of a directed verdict often failed to raise the
easier claim that the manifest weight of the evidence contradicted the
verdict and thus necessitated a new trial.108
At the same time, two parallel movements in the federal courts
helped to obscure the underutilization of the new‐trial remedy. First,
parties more often accepted remedies short of a jury trial. Civil claims
were more often settled, and criminal cases more often resulted in a plea
bargain.109 Second, there was a significant growth in the use of
involuntary dismissal. The “summary judgment trilogy” of cases made it
easier for civil defendants to obtain a favorable judgment without going
to trial.110 As lawyers and judges saw jury trials less frequently, there
107 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 172 (2008) (“This
confusion is not limited to the attorneys who may overlook weight points when they draft
their appeal. Instead, appellate courts sometimes overlook weight‐of‐the‐evidence points
even when a party clearly raises such a point of appeal. Courts have treated such
arguments instead as sufficiency points, seeming to ignore their own precedent about the
difference between weight and sufficiency.”); see also 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2806 (3d ed. 2016) (“There are . . . a few cases
that have confused the standard on a new‐trial motion with that on a directed‐verdict
motion.”).
108

Id.

See Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 995, 1018 (1994) (“In addition to the growth of ADR, more and more cases are
resolved pretrial by settlements and pleas. . . . [F]ewer and fewer cases are actually being
tried.”).
109

Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment
Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2006)
(“Collectively, the trilogy is viewed as a ‘celebration of summary judgment’ and a
mandate for federal courts to embrace the use of summary judgment to dispose of cases
before trial”) (quoting Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other
110
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were fewer opportunities to raise the claim that the jury’s verdict
contradicted the weight of the evidence.
In 1996, the Supreme Court reversed course and held that the
appellate courts could review the trial judge’s decision for an abuse of
discretion.111 At that time, some onlookers expected that appellate review
of the weight of the evidence would become commonplace in federal
court, as it is in a number of states.112 The Supreme Court’s decision to
make rulings of the weight of the evidence reviewable on appeal was said
to represent a “dramatic” shift in the law.113
In the twenty years since Gasperini, however, trial judge decisions
on the weight of the evidence are still appealed far less often in federal
court than they are in most state courts. The federal circuit courts of
appeals typically reverse just over 2000 judgments each year, but only a
handful of those reversals—less than one‐half of one percent—are based
on the weight of the evidence.114 In Texas, by contrast, where the right to
review is much more systematized, four percent of reversals are based on
the weight of the evidence.115
B. The Missing Gravitational Pull of Federal Procedure
The Texas position is not entirely unusual among the state courts,
though it does have a better‐developed procedure to review weight of the
Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1114‐15
(1986)). The “trilogy” refers to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
111

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996).

Donald F. Paine, Paine on Procedure: Federal Judges As 13th Jurors, TENN. B.J., July 1999, at
20, 32 (expecting that in the aftermath of Gasperini, “weight of evidence motions will
become routine” in federal court).
112

11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2819 (3d ed.
2016).

113

114

Robertson, supra note 21, at 171.

Id. Texas jurisprudence refers to verdicts contrary to the great weight of the evidence as
“factually insufficient,” as opposed to the “legal insufficiency” that would support a
directed verdict. Robertson, supra note 21, at 171.

115
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evidence than most states.116 In general, state courts are more comfortable
with weight‐of the‐evidence review than are federal courts. Even though
state constitutions typically protected the right to a jury trial, they did not
include re‐examination clauses similar to the federal one. As a result, the
states allowed a consistent history of appellate review.117 To the extent
that the states had any limit on appellate review of jury verdicts at all,
they tended to give the intermediate appellate courts the exclusive power
to review the “factual sufficiency” or “manifest weight” of the
evidence.118 As a result, the state standards for granting new trials are
better developed and much more commonly applied than the federal
standards, and the new‐trial remedy is not underutilized in state court to
the extent that it is in federal court.119

See W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 40
(2010) (providing an overview of factual sufficiency review); W. Wendell Hall & Mark
Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil and Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49
S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 605 (2008) (describing “Texas’ heritage as a dual‐standard state” where
both factual and legal sufficiency review have a well developed history).

116

Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil
Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 871 (2014) (“Language similar to the first clause
of the Seventh Amendment, the Preservation Clause, was ubiquitous in state
constitutions. The second clause, the Re‐examination Clause, was unique to the Federal
Constitution.”).
117

See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (providing that judgments of the intermediate courts of
appeals in Texas “shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on
appeal or error,” a clause that has been interpreted to mean that weight‐of‐the‐evidence
points can be raised in the intermediate appellate courts but not in the Supreme Court);
State v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ohio 1998) (“This court does not ordinarily evaluate the
manifest weight of the evidence in cases evaluated by the courts of appeals.”); Liska v.
Chicago Rys. Co., 149 N.E. 469, 476 (Ill. 1925) (“The provisions of the Practice Act that
judgments of the Appellate Court shall be final as to all matters of fact in controversy in
actions at law are not unconstitutional, because the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the
Constitution does not include the right to a review of the facts by this court.”).
118

See, e.g., Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Reasons for Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals,
44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431, 440, 443 (2003); People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 57‐58 (N.Y. 2003)
(noting that in New York, the Court of Appeals applies weight‐of‐the‐evidence review in
death‐penalty cases, which are appealed directly to the highest court, and the
intermediate courts routinely conduct weight‐of‐the‐evidence review in other cases); York
v. Rush‐Presbyterian‐St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 222 Ill. 2d 147, 179 (Ill. 2006) (“A new trial
should be granted only when the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. . . . A reviewing court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision with respect to a
119
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However, even though new trials on the weight of the evidence
may be granted more often in state court, there is still significant
disagreement about the role that weight of the evidence review should
play within the overall framework of the state justice system, and
disagreement—both within and among states—about the standards to be
applied in reviewing jury verdicts.120 This divergence is not, by itself,
problematic; the states, after all, have their own procedural rules
appropriate for their own circumstances.121 But it is nevertheless
significant, as a unified federal procedure generally exerts a significant
“gravitational pull” on state practice.122
Federal procedure in other areas—including the adoption of the
federal rules in general,123 the expansion of summary judgment practice
thereafter,124 and more recently (though perhaps to a lesser degree) with

motion for a new trial unless it finds that the circuit court abused its discretion.”); State v.
Scott, 800 N.E.2d 1133, 1140 (Ohio 2004) (“[A] challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is
different from a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence.”).
120

See supra Part II.

See Dodson, supra note 99, at 707 (“In the post‐1938 world, federal and state courts
independently develop and apply their own procedures. . . . Thus, states are free to adopt
their own rules of procedure, and state courts are free to interpret their state rules
independently of federal rules and federal judicial opinions.”); see also Joseph A. Wickes,
The New Rule‐Making Power of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 8 (1934)
(explaining how the ABA’s creation of a Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure came
about as a response to the “utter failure of the Conformity Act to bring about uniformity
in federal and state procedure in civil cases”).
121

Id. at 710 (“In every state, federal rulemakers have exerted an extraordinary
gravitational pull on state rulemakers.”).

122

John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1427 (1986) (finding that
approximately half of American states had based their procedural rules almost entirely on
the federal rules, and that even in the other states, the federal rules had been highly
influential).
123

Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey
of Intra‐State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 326‐29 (2001) (noting the influence of federal summary‐
judgment practice on the states).
124
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“plausibility” pleading125—encouraged the convergence of state
practice.126 States tended to at least consider the adoption of federal
procedural rules—and even when a state opted not to follow the federal
rule, judicial explanations of the decision to diverge from federal practice
helped clarify the contours of, and reasons for, the continued application
of a differing state practice.127
But with regard to new trials on the weight of the evidence, there
has been no push for convergence among the states. The evolving
application of the rule over two and half centuries has led to a
significantly different application of the practice.128 As described earlier,
new trials on the weight of the evidence date back at least to the time of
Blackstone, and were engrained within the founding of the states.129
See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between Federal
and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111 (2010) (suggesting that “the
splintering of pleading standards in the wake of Iqbal has the potential to usher in a new
era of procedural diversity”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009), “a case that
radically transformed federal civil litigation by abolishing notice pleading in favor of
plausibility pleading”); Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2008) (“The Twombly
decision presents Conley states with perhaps the most critical civil procedure decision
since they chose to adopt the Federal Rules.”) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007)).
125

126

Dodson, supra note 99, at 710.

This process is occurring now as states consider whether to adopt the federal
“plausibility pleading” framework found in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). See, e.g., Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588, 595
(Co. 2016) (“Because we understand our prior cases as reflecting the merit of interpreting
our rules of civil pleading harmoniously with the corresponding federal rules, wherever
that can be accomplished without violating our own interpretative rules or interfering
with important state policy, and because we find the interpretative gloss added by the
Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal to be very much in line with the direction our rule‐
making has taken and the current needs of the civil justice system in this jurisdiction, we
join those other states already embracing the plausibility standard articulated in those
cases as a statement of the pleading requirements of their own analogs to Federal Rule
8.”); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tenn. 2011)
(“We decline to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” pleading standard and
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”).
127

128

See supra Part II.

129

Id.
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Given the tremendous changes that have occurred over the last two and
half centuries, in society in general as well as the justice system in
particular, it is not surprising that the law and doctrine surrounding the
new‐trial motion would face significant evolution in the states.
Without the influence of a standard federal‐court approach, there
has been little attention paid to the divergence of state standards. It is rare
for state courts to refer to decisions of other states in developing or
applying the standards by which they review the weight of the evidence
after a jury trial.130 The divergences expand over time and run deep: in
addition to differences in nomenclature, states disagree about the same
fundamental aspects of the standard that have caused fractures in federal
practice, including the degree of “wrongness” of the jury’s verdict;
whether the trial judge should view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict; and whether the trial judge can
independently assess witness credibility. However, the longer history of
appellate standardization within (though not among) the individual
states causes the state differences to be more entrenched and less likely to
result from confusion or unfamiliarity with the governing standard.131
C. The Changing Appellate Court View of Deference and Discretion
A compounding factor that inhibits uniformity in both state and
federal courts is the changing relationship of appellate courts and trial
courts over the last half century. As appellate review has grown in
importance, appellate courts’ deference to the trial court has
diminished.132 Interestingly, this shift occurred even as the trial judge’s
role grew overall, as judges took a notably more “managerial” role in the
pretrial and trial process—especially in pushing the parties toward

130

Id. at II.A.

131 See supra note 117 (noting that the state constitutions did not contain a provision
paralleling the Re‐Examination Clause).

Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1237 (2013)
(explaining that “[i]n the early days of the United States, the right to appellate review was
significantly limited,” and tracing the growth of appellate remedies).
132
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settlement.133 But at the same time the trial judge grew more powerful in
relation to the parties and their lawyers, the trial judge also faced more
exacting appellate scrutiny.134
In federal court, this changing relationship was largely obscured
by the pre‐Gasperini reluctance of appellate courts to review weight‐of‐
the‐evidence decisions.135 But in the post‐Gasperini era in federal court—
and in the state courts more generally—appellate scrutiny of weight‐of‐
the‐evidence challenges has grown increasingly complex as appellate
review has taken a larger role in the justice system as a whole. This has
led to even greater doctrinal disorder in the federal courts, as the passage
of two decades since Gasperini has not been enough time for the appellate
courts to offer greater standardization. The states have taken a more
organized approach, but it is nevertheless an approach that has evolved
toward giving the appellate court a greater role in assessing weight‐of‐
the‐evidence challenges.136
The role of appellate review has grown significantly in the
modern era.137 At the time of the founding, trials were the predominant

133 Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376‐77 (1982) (“In growing
numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to them by
litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of
disputes and to supervise case preparation.”).

Samuel P. Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 ALA. L. REV. 547, 576 (2009) (“The federal appellate
caseload has increased dramatically in the last fifty years, and the increase in the number
of judges authorized to decide those cases has not come close to keeping pace. As a result,
the number of dispositions per judge has increased steadily over time, giving rise to
concerns about the effect of judicial strain on the quality of justice delivered by the federal
appellate system.”).
134

See supra Part III.A; see also 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2819 (3d ed. 2016); U.S. v. Laub, 37 U.S. 1, 12 Pet. 1, 9 L. Ed. 977, 1838
WL 3936 (1838) (stating that it is “a point too well settled to be now drawn into question,
that the effect and sufficiency of the evidence, are for the consideration and determination
of the jury; and the error is to be redressed, if at all, by application to the court below for a
new trial, and cannot be made a ground of objection on a writ of error.”).
135

136

See infra this Part.

137

See Robertson, supra note 132 at 1237.
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way to resolve cases.138 Under this system, both judges and juries had a
significant role. The jury would hear evidence, pass judgement on
witness credibility, and resolve questions of fact.139 The judge could
exercise significant discretion in instructing the jury before the start of
deliberations and in ordering a new trial upon disagreement with the
jury’s verdict.140 Appellate courts had only a very limited role in
correcting legal error.141
Over time, appellate courts began more closely scrutinizing the
exercise of trial court discretion.142 Some scholars supported this trend,
suggesting that when the appellate court has access to the same record
evidence as the trial court, there is little if any reason to defer to the trial
judge’s decision.143 However, as the scope of appellate review expanded

Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 883 (2002)
(“The civil jury is virtually the only Anglo‐American adjudicatory device to have
functioned serviceably for more than 900 years. Its long history reflects not the endurance
of a sanctified relic but the adaptability of a decision‐making mechanism that affords
society substantial and unique benefits.”).
138

Id. at 874 (“By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, the English had adopted
procedures which made it clear that the jury was not simply a collection of witnesses, but
a deliberative body. . . . [T]he jury gradually shifted from reliance on its own knowledge
to dependence on the testimony of witnesses in open court. The jury was thus
transformed into an evaluator of proofs.”).
139

140 Id. at 888 (“[U]ndoubtedly, new trials had a role to play in mid‐eighteenth century
English courtrooms. . . . The new trial mechanism thus imported into American practice
was one vested in the trial court to overturn a clearly unjust decision. It was to be
employed to set the stage for the submission of the case to a second jury.”).

See id. at 889 (“During the nineteenth century, appellate court judges were not
permitted to consider the question of new trials.”); see also Martin B. Louis, Allocating
Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View
of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993,
1000 (1986) (“The only exception to free review of questions of law is in the area of
administrative law, in which appellate courts occasionally defer to agency declarations of
general legal principles.”).
141

Louis, supra note 141, at 999–1000 (noting that “[a]ppellate courts today more readily
find abuses of procedural discretion”).

142

Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 184 (1978)
(“When the appellate court has as much before it as the trial judge did, and when the
matter is not one of those issues in which the circumstances are so diffuse that no rule or

143
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into areas traditionally reserved for the jury,144 other academic
commentators expressed concern about this expansion, especially when
that appellate review increased the overall scrutiny given to jury
verdicts.145
By the time the Supreme Court ruled in Gasperini that appellate
courts could review new trial rulings on the weight of the evidence for
“abuse of discretion,” that very concept was in the middle of a transition,
as appellate courts were more closely scrutinizing trial court discretion in
other areas.146 The lack of earlier appellate systematization already
clouded the scope of the trial judge’s discretion to grant a new trial. Now,
there was a compounding factor: once appellate courts started to review
trial judges’ rulings on evidentiary weight, how should the appellate
court determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion?

standard can be fashioned, the appellate court should not defer to the trial judge’s choice
in the absence of some particular and cogent reason for doing so.”).
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court justices had
viewed a video of the police chase that gave rise to the case, and concluding based on that
viewing that “no reasonable jury” could have believed the plaintiff’s account of the case”);
David Kessler, Justices in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 434–35 (2008) (“Harris raises
the concern that the seductive quality of video evidence may lead courts to conclude too
quickly that genuine issues of material fact are absent, thereby usurping the jury’s fact‐
finding role. The precedent set by Harris allows appellate courts to decide more cases
involving video evidence during summary judgment.”).
144

E.g. Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 435, 474–75 (2014) (“Judicial
encroachment on the jury’s role in drawing inferences violates an important tenet of our
judicial system: ensuring that disputes are resolved by a group of people whose diverse
attributes and experiences accurately reflect the community.”); Dan M. Kahan, et al.,
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. 837, 904 (2009) (“There were multiple avenues available to the Court for
reversing in Scott, we have suggested. But the justification it chose was the one that
maximized the experience of exclusion for a recognizable segment of the American
citizenry, needlessly infusing the decision with culturally partisan overtones that
detracted from the law’s legitimacy.”).
145

See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
751, 758–763 (1957) (charting the rise of appellate scrutiny of trial court rulings and
expressing a pre‐Gasperini concern that appellate courts improperly reviewing decisions to
grant or deny a new trial on the weight of the evidence).
146
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Unsurprisingly, federal courts have split over the question of how
much deference to give to trial court decisions granting or denying a
motion for a new trial and what exactly an “abuse of discretion” looks
like in this context.147 Courts generally agree that a trial court abuses its
discretion by stating and applying the wrong standard.148 But if the trial
court believed the jury’s verdict to be against the weight of the evidence,
and therefore granted a new trial, and the appellate court disagrees—
does that necessarily mean that the trial court abused its discretion?149
What if the trial court refused to grant a new trial, and the appellate court
concludes that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence?150 On these points, the federal circuits continue to disagree.151
The state courts, by contrast, tend to be more comfortable with
appellate review of the trial court’s decision. In part, this comfort level
may stem from the fact that state courts have not historically been
forbidden from reviewing the weight of the evidence.152 Perhaps as a
147 Robertson, supra note 21, at 197‐99 (noting that some federal courts apply an abuse of
discretion standard very close to de novo review, while others will review the decision to
grant a new trial more strictly that the decision to deny it, and that some courts have
issued conflicting opinions from time to time without noting the different standards).

See Gill v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 1985); Williams v.
Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1959) (both reversing judgments in which the district
court had mis‐stated the standard for reviewing the weight of the evidence).
148

149 See Urti v. Transport Commercial Corp., 479 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1973); Georgia–Pacific
Corp. v. U.S., 264 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1959) (both overturning the grant of a new trial).

Robertson, supra note 21, at 197‐99 (explaining the some circuits will give greater
deference to a trial court’s denial of a new trial than to the grant of a new trial).

150

Compare Bank of Am., N.A. v. JB Hanna, LLC, 766 F.3d 841, 851 (8th Cir. 2014) (“We
conclude that the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion by denying the
Bank’s motion for a new trial, because the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence.”) with Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir.2000) (“[A] district court
deni[al] [of] a motion for a new trial made on the ground that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence ... is not reviewable on appeal.”) (quoting Dailey v. Societe
Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 458 (2d Cir.1997)) but see Hughes v. Town of Bethlehem, No. 15‐
1758‐CV, 2016 WL 1129993, at *3 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2016) (noting that the Second Circuit
had been inconsistent in forbidding appellate review of the denial of a new trial on the
weight of the evidence).
151

Federal courts, on the other hand, could not review such rulings until 1996. Gasperini
v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996).

152
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result, states have developed mechanisms to assist in that review—
typically by requiring the trial judge to explain the decision to grant a
new trial, even requiring a detailed explanation of the evidence
supporting or contradicting the verdict.153 Indiana, for example, requires
that the trial judge explain why he or she is granting a new trial. A judge
who grants a new trial on the weight of the evidence must detail the
evidence supporting and opposing the jury’s verdict and must explain
why the new trial is warranted.154 The court has held that “[i]t is
compliance with the arduous and time‐consuming requirements of the
Rule which provides assurance to the parties and the courts that the
judge’s evaluation of the evidence is better than the evaluation of the
jury.”155 Georgia likewise suggests a need for the trial judge to explain the
decision, or at least to specifically state that the court had “exercise[d] its
discretion” by independently weighing the evidence in response to a
motion for a new trial.156 These procedures help clarify the role of
appellate court review in the state courts. Unfortunately, no real parallel
exists in the federal system.157
IV.

CURING INVISIBLE ERROR IN THE ERA OF THE VANISHING TRIAL

As a result of the lack of judicial divergence and doctrinal
disorder described above, trial judges across the judicial system have
been unable to consistently review unjust jury verdicts and correct for

153 See, e.g., In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary LP, 290 S.W.3d 204, 207
(Tex. 2009) (“We direct the trial court to specify its reasons for disregarding the jury’s
verdict and granting a new trial, to the extent it did so.”)

IND. R. TRIAL P. 59(J) (“[I]f the decision is found to be against the weight of the evidence,
the findings shall relate the supporting and opposing evidence to each issue upon which a
new trial is granted.”).
154

155

Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 358 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ind. 1976).

156

Gomillion v. State, 769 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 2015).

Robertson, supra note 21, at 211‐12 (arguing that trial courts should do more to explain
their rulings when granting or denying a new trial); see also Stafford v. Neurological
Medicine, Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1987) (“A district court does not properly
exercise its discretionary authority when it fails to articulate the analysis utilized to justify
upsetting a jury’s verdict.”).
157
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invisible error hiding behind veil of deliberative secrecy.158 The power to
order a new trial on the weight of the evidence arose long ago, when jury
trials were the legal system’s dominant mode of resolving cases. In the
modern era, increased appellate scrutiny of trial court rulings have
created an opportunity for a more systematized review of new‐trial
motions.159 Even as other forms of judicial power increased—including a
trend toward “managerial judging,” which expanded the trial judge’s
sphere of authority—weight of the evidence review has continued to be
treated as an afterthought in federal court and as a local quirk of state
procedure in state court.160
At the same time as appellate scrutiny of trial rulings has
increased, however, the overall number of trials (especially jury trials) has
markedly decreased.161 Jury trials have gone from relatively rare to an
endangered species.162 The ABA’s “Vanishing Trial” has documented the
decline in jury trials over the last half‐century, finding that by the early
part of the twenty‐first century, less than two percent of civil cases in
federal court (and less than one percent of civil cases in state court) ever
get to trial.163 On the criminal side, approximately two percent of felony
cases go to trial; the rate is even lower for misdemeanors.164
Given the modern rarity of jury trials, it may seem superfluous
and inefficient to allow not just one trial, but two. This is especially true
in light of evidence that juries typically exercise their responsibilities
faithfully, and reach the same result the judge would have reached in
158

See supra Parts II and III.
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See supra Part III.C.
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See supra Part III.A.

Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1807 (2015) (“Even when
trials were thought to be the norm, the rate of actual trials ranged from 12‐20%.”).
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Id.
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Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 30 ABA LITIGATION 2 (2004).

See M. Clara Garcia Hernandez, Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideon’s Gold: How Much
Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. 2358, 2364 (2013) (noting that “[o]ur trial rate the past
two years has been 1.1% for felonies, and less than 0.5% for misdemeanors,” which was
somewhat lower than the 2.3% felony trial rate reported in a study of nine states).
164
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approximately 78% of both civil and criminal cases.165 Courts know that
juries generally reach the right result, and even when a jury verdict might
reasonably be questioned, judges often express a need to protect the
jury’s verdict against intrusion from above.166 The Sixth Circuit, for
example, has cautioned that when a trial judge decides to grant a new
trial on the weight of the evidence without a finding that the jury process
was tainted by an “undesirable or pernicious element,” the judge thereby
“effects a denigration of the jury system” and potentially usurps the
jury’s role.167
Unfortunately, however, deliberative secrecy means that the judge
may not have seen or known that such an “undesirable or pernicious
element” had influenced the jury’s decision. What if the juror’s
statements in Peña‐Rodriguez had never come to light? The judge would
never have known that pure racial bias was injected into the jury’s
decision, though that is as “undesirable or pernicious” an element as one
can imagine. As a result, even in this era of the vanishing trial the trial
judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence remains an important
structural safeguard of the trial process.
In the absence of the traditional factors pushing toward
procedural standardization, doctrinal coherence requires that courts work
harder to adopt a coherent theory of the new‐trial remedy and its role in
protecting due process. As Professor Gregory Sisk has observed in
academic legal research, “theory provides the context,” showing what is
worthy of further study and offering guidance in “interpreting what has
been observed.”168 In the absence of a history of federal appellate
attention guiding the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion, it becomes
even more important to explicitly articulate the goals and purposes of the
trial judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence. This Part
165

NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 148‐51 (2007).
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WRIGHT et al., supra note 45, at § 2806.

Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Static Control
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D. Ky. 2010).
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Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of
Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 891 (2008).
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examines the two largest functions of that review: protecting the
deliberative process and promoting decisional accuracy. It concludes that
these functions are significant enough that the trial judge’s authority to
review evidentiary weight should be afforded procedural due process
protection.
A. Protecting the Deliberative Process
Is deliberative secrecy even worth the risk of jury misconduct or
error? In general, restrictions on jury secrecy, as well as Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b)’s prohibition on allowing jurors to impeach their own
verdict, forbid the court from inquiring into the basis of the jury’s
decision.169 Allowing greater communication between judge and jury
would seem to alleviate many of the grounds for error within the jury
process. Without a strict rule protecting deliberative secrecy, attorneys
could inquire whether the jurors improperly based their decisions on
matters outside the evidence. And certainly, some limits on deliberative
secrecy may be desirable, necessary, and even constitutionally required.170
At the Supreme Court’s oral argument in the Peña‐Rodriguez case, the
Court questioned the attorneys extensively about various state rules that
make an exception to deliberative secrecy in order to allow evidence of
racial bias or animus. Both the justices and the attorneys arguing the case
struggled to draw a line between the defendant’s right to a jury trial free
of racial bias and the tradition of jury secrecy.171 Ultimately, the Court
drew a line that allowed inquiry into juror deliberation only for cases of
racial bias (not for other types of bias or misconduct) and only when that
racial bias was “overt.”172 There are few cases that meet both of these
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (providing that “a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental
processes in connection therewith”).
169

Pena‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513, Transcript of Oral Argument,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15‐
606_5iel.pdf (Oct. 11, 2016).
170
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Id.
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Peña‐Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017).
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requirements; as the justices pointed out in oral argument, Peña‐
Rodriguez is a highly unusual case.
As a result, courts will continue to struggle to reconcile due
process protection with the policies behind jury secrecy. These goals are
not always in opposition. Rule 606(b) was enacted to protect due process
by encouraging full and open deliberation among jurors. In general,
encouraging free and open deliberation is essential to the jury process. If
jurors self‐censor, hiding the thoughts that motivate their ultimate votes
in the jury room, then the deliberative process cannot work effectively. As
the Texas Supreme Court stated in an earlier case raising issues of juror
secrecy:
[J]ury deliberations must be kept private to encourage jurors
to candidly discuss the case. A verdict is a collaborative effort
requiring individuals from different backgrounds to reach a
consensus. A juror should feel free to raise and consider an
unpopular viewpoint. To discharge their duties effectively,
jurors must be able to discuss the evidence and issues without
fear that their deliberations will later be held up to public
scrutiny.173
These rules protect the jury’s independence and reflect “the
determination that the value of deliberative secrecy outweighs the risk
that some juror misconduct during deliberations will be beyond the
court’s power to remedy.”174
In particular, the advisory committee notes note that the practice
of forbidding juror impeachment evidence promotes other factors
beyondthe “freedom of deliberation,” including both the “finality of
verdicts,” and “protection of jurors against annoyance.”175 These
considerations are important: if juror impeachment evidence were freely
available, a losing litigant would have every incentive to question the

173

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 367 (Tex. 2000).
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Courselle, supra note 19, at 229.
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FED. R. EVID. 606, Advisory Committee Notes.
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jurors after the verdict, seeking not just information to help improve their
trial technique for future trials (as lawyers may do even now176), but
seeking to discredit the jurors themselves. Even under the current system,
where post‐trial contact with jurors is entirely voluntary (and information
learned from such interviews is inadmissible), jurors report feeling
intruded upon and pressured by inquiries from the parties and the
media.177 It is not clear that the jury system could survive the pressure
and scrutiny that would be applied by attorneys seeking to uncover error
in the jury process.
Furthermore, improper jury decision making is not always a one‐
way street. Certainly in some cases (as in Peña‐Rodriguez’s case) an
improper jury verdict comes from outside the evidence—more
specifically, from considering extraneous, irrelevant, or inadmissible
factors. However, this failure in jury deliberations is also associated with
an evidentiary presentation that fails to meet overall confidence levels—
that is, if the jurors are not confident that the evidence as a whole is
strong enough to reach a firm belief, they may turn to other proxies in
arriving at their decision.178

Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should
It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L.
REV. 262, 294 (2012) (explaining that “the Rule’s prohibition only bars a juror from
conveying testimony in court, but it does not prohibit jurors from speaking to other
people,” and noting that jurors may voluntarily speak with the attorneys or others after
the verdict has been issued).
176

David Weinstein, Protecting A Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and
Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (“Jurors do not volunteer for service; they are
compelled, on pain of contempt, to perform their necessary function. . . . [O]pinion
surveys have found invasion of privacy to be a frequent complaint registered by jurors
about their service.”).
177

Id.; see also Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1963 (2008)
(recommending the use of “rules of weight” to reduce the harm of juror reliance on
heuristics and biases); Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence,
105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 244‐45 (2006) (explaining that decision heuristics may help explain
why juries overvalue direct evidence and undervalue circumstantial evidence); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 93
(2000) (discussing hindsight bias and the “representativeness heuristic,” and noting that
judges can better identify errors in jury decision making).
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Of course, this emphasis on juror privacy and independence does
not mean that jury misconduct is not a problem—and it certainly does not
mean that juror misconduct that infects a verdict should not go
unremedied. But even if, as seems likely, the Supreme Court rules that a
juror’s overt racial discrimination violated the defendants right to a fair
trial, the underlying structural problems remains. There are still many
other types of jury behavior that are also problematic, even if they do not
rise to the level of racial discrimination.179 And even racially biased
decision making itself will not always be apparent; in many cases, it may
fly under the radar, unapparent to the judge or to the parties, but still
influencing the ultimate verdict. If the threat were only one of racism,
better pre‐trial screening of venire members might minimize the risk of a
biased jury and reduce the pressure to inquire into deliberations.180 But as
one observer has noted, “cases involving affirmative misconduct by
jurors are legion in number and variety.”181 There are many other
prejudices and irrationalities that can come into play, and no way to
predict them all ahead of time.182
Therefore, even though overt racial discrimination is carved out as
an exception to a the general rule that jury‐room evidence is inadmissible,
there is a need for the trial judge to take an active role in reviewing the
At oral argument, the Court raised the possibility that jurors might simply toss a coin to
decide a verdict. Such a procedure would be fundamentally arbitrary, but it would not be
addressed by a narrow rule that allowed evidence of improper decision making only
when allegations of racial bias were raised.
179

See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post‐Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 165, 169 (2011) (“By honestly and systematically acknowledging,
addressing, and excising juror biases prior to deliberation, overt acts of bias during
deliberations, and the consequent pressure to carve a broad exception to the evidentiary
prohibition, can be reduced.”).
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Edward T. Swaine, Note, Pre‐Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and
Juror Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 190 (1988) (citing instances of intoxication, sleeping
through testimony, and undisclosed conflicts of interest).
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Lee Goldman, Post‐Verdict Challenges to Racial Comments Made During Juror Deliberations,
61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 19 (2010) (“[I]n a case where a defendant testifies on her own
behalf, comments such as, ‘I don’t trust anyone with beady eyes,’ or, ‘What difference
does it make if the defendant is guilty, he is a bad guy,’ seem to demonstrate partiality or
unfairness as much as ”statements particularly referencing race.”).
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weight of the evidence after a jury verdict. Logic suggests that a verdict
tainted by prejudice, stereotypes, and extraneous, irrelevant information
runs a higher risk of not being supported by the evidence; after all, if the
evidence alone were strong enough to support the ruling, jurors would
not need to look elsewhere for arguments to buttress their position.
Because the judge cannot directly find out why the jury ruled as it did—
and cannot ask directly whether the jury engaged in improper decision
making—allowing the judge to make an independent assessment that the
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence acts as safety valve.
It allows the trial judge to grant a new trial “when the judge believes, but
does not know for certain, that the jury based its verdict on something
other than a rational review of the evidence.”183 In this way, the jury’s
independence is maintained, but the party subjected to a potentially
unjust verdict may still seek relief from the trial court.
B. Promoting Decisional Accuracy
Perhaps the most important reason for the judge to review
evidentiary weight is the goal of obtaining a higher level of accuracy—
and thus a higher level of confidence in the result of the judicial process.
It is true that at the time the practice was adopted there were serious
deficiencies in the jury process that left open a need for further review.
Courts in the Blackstonian era, for example, would forbid jurors from
eating or drinking until they were able to reach a verdict—which had the
perverse result that verdicts were more likely to reflect the wishes of
those who were physically strongest, rather than those who could
persuade the others through logic or reason.184 Under these conditions, it
was not surprising that the trial judge would need to have the power to
undo a manifestly unjust verdict.
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Robertson, supra note 21, at 161.

People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801) (“The doctrine of compelling a
jury to unanimity, by the pains of hunger and fatigue, so that the verdict, in fact, be
founded not on temperate discussion, and clear conviction, but on strength of body, is a
monstrous doctrine, . . . altogether repugnant to a sense of humanity and justice. A verdict
of acquittal or conviction, obtained under such circumstances, can never receive the
sanction of public opinion.”).
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Counterintuitively, however, the new‐trial right may be even
more important in the era of the vanishing trial. We have procedural tools
to eliminate clearly meritless cases early on, and alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms to encourage settlement in the vast majority of
remaining cases.185 This means that for the few cases that do go to trial,
the evidence is unlikely to be completely one sided.186 At the same time, it
is also more likely that there are non‐evidentiary issues hampering
settlement: perhaps outrageous or emotionally compelling facts, perhaps
significant emotional investment by one or more of the litigants, or
perhaps a widely divergent estimate between the plaintiff and defendant
of the recoverable damages.187 The new‐trial right protects against the risk
that jurors will be overly influenced by extralegal considerations.
In most cases, the jury‐trial process works very well to arrive at a
fair‐minded and rational result. The high concordance between the
judge’s view of the evidence and the jury’s view certainly evokes
confidence in the jury system as a whole.188 But that same interplay of
See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1810 (2015) (“[T]he
presumptions about a judge’s role have switched from one focused on deciding issues
when parties requested the intervention to one focused on shepherding the case to its end.
This end is no longer presumed to be resolution on the merits and preparation for trial,
but is instead presumed to be a non‐trial exit.”).
185

This evidence is not likely to be completely balanced, however; there is some evidence
that defendants may be better able to evaluate the merits of the case, resulting in better
outcomes for the cases that fail to settle. Geraldine Soat Brown, What Happens to Cases That
Don’t Settle?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 25 (noting that of the cases ultimately
going to trial, “eight were tried to a jury, three were tried to a judge; plaintiffs prevailed at
trial in three of these cases (one jury trial and two bench trials) and defendants prevailed
in seven trials (six jury trials and one bench trial); one case resulted in a split verdict”).
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See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of
Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 343 (1999) (conducting an empirical study on
settlement and finding that factors discouraging settlement included “the importance of
differences in the parties’ estimations of the likely outcome at trial, the importance of
information and the influence the judge can have on party estimates and strategic
behavior”); Peter H. Huang & Ho‐Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 31, 41 (1992) (“We have shown how certain emotional responses can increase
the number of cases brought to trial and serve to make the threat of going to trial be a
credible one. . . . [A]nger or pride can lead to a higher frequency of trials . . . .”).
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broad agreement between judge and jury in the majority of cases suggests
that something problematic might be going on in the 22% of cases where
judge and jury disagree: certainly in some cases, it may simply be a
matter of “reasonable minds” differing.189 In other cases, however—that
is, the ones where the trial judge is convinced that a “manifest injustice”
has been done—it may suggest that the jury based its conclusion on
something other than the evidence put before it.
One explanation for this subset of cases is what Professor Luke
Meier has described as the difference between “confidence” and
“probability” in the trial evidence.190 In a civil case where the evidence is
disputed enough to avoid summary judgment (that is, there is a genuine
question of material fact for the jury to resolve191), the jury may
reasonably and properly decide that one side’s evidence was stronger
than the other side’s.192 But a reasonable factfinder may also believe, on
the same evidence, that the overall evidence presented at trial is not
strong enough to form a confident belief that the facts presented by the
side with the stronger evidence are in fact true.193 Thus, when the jury is
asked to apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to pick a
winner, it can do so—but the individual jurors would not be confident
enough in the overall case to be willing to wager their own money on the
result.194 Meier recommends assigning the “confidence analysis” to the
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Id.

Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 MISS. L.J. 747,
750 (2015).
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (“[T]he trial judge shall then
grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56).
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Meier, supra note 190, at 814.

Id. at 796 (“Simply put, when the available evidence on a disputed question of fact is
too generic, there can be very little confidence in any probability conclusion drawn from
that evidence.”).
193

See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s Plausibility Standard, 68 SMU L.
REV. 331, 341 (2015) (“[A]lthough George thinks that his probability estimate is accurate
based on the limited information he has considered, he concludes that the amount of
information he has considered is not adequate for the purpose of deciding whether to
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judge and the “probability” analysis to the jury.195 The judge’s power to
review the weight of the evidence is at least in part just such a confidence
analysis—is the evidence as a whole not just sufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to reach the proffered conclusion, but also strong enough
that the judicial system should have confidence in the conclusion?
An emphasis on evidentiary weight can also improve decisional
accuracy when the evidence is unbalanced enough that the judge is
tempted to grant summary judgment. Trial judges’ reliance on summary
judgment has grown, even as their power to review evidentiary weight
has gone underused and under‐appreciated.196 A recent study of cases in
which the district court granted summary judgment and the appellate
court reversed demonstrated that for at least a small subset of those cases,
the jury ultimately returned a verdict for the non‐moving party.197 In
these cases, a focus on evidentiary weight would have avoided the initial
error. Because this discrepancy happened “more frequently in civil rights
cases,” review of evidentiary weight may be especially important to
protect litigants’ rights in this area.198
Finally, the trial judge’s review of evidentiary weight is needed to
protect against wrongful conviction. DNA testing has vividly

wager a bet with his friend or not. Before a wager is placed, additional information is
desired . . . .”).
Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 MISS. L.J. 747,
814 (2015) (“Because the confidence analysis requires a legal or policy determination, the
confidence principle should be assigned to a trial court judge only and not to the jury.”).

195

See Patricia Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998) (calling
summary judgment “a potential juggernaut which, if not carefully monitored, could
threaten the relatively small residue of civil trials that remain”).
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Michael W. Pfautz, Note, What Would A Reasonable Jury Do? Jury Verdicts Following
Summary Judgment Reversals, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1287 (2015) (“In these cases, the trial
judge granted summary judgment for the movant, the court of appeals reversed, and the
case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).
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civil rights cases.”).
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demonstrated that innocent people can be convicted.199 The popular
media, including podcasts like Serial and Undisclosed, as well as television
shows like Making a Murderer, have brought national attention to the
shortcomings of the jury‐trial process for protecting against wrongful
conviction.200 The appellate system has likewise not been sufficiently
protective.201 Encouraging the trial court to exercise review over the
strength and weight of the evidence as a whole (and thus ensuring that
the evidence meets the requisite confidence level202) can help guard
against the conviction of the innocent.

The Innocence Project records 343 convicted individuals who were later exonerated by
DNA evidence, including 13 people on death row. Innocence Project, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/cases/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2016). Including non‐DNA reasons
for exoneration brings the numbers of to “more than 600 known wrongful convictions
since 1973. One hundred forty of those exonerations involved citizens who had been
sentenced to death.” Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87
WASH. L. REV. 139, 142 (2012).
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See Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy Imperative, 65 DUKE L.J.
697, 725–26 & n. 171 (2016) (“Furthermore, as popular accounts of the incidence, causes,
and impact of wrongful convictions have proliferated, they have also raised broader
awareness of the potential for error. . . . The enormous success of the “Serial” podcast ‐‐
which attracted millions of listeners and raised awareness about potential inaccuracies ‐‐
exemplifies the emerging concern with reliability.”); see also Mariam Khan, The Reasons
‘Serial’ Subject Adnan Syed May Receive a New Trial, abcNEWS.com (July 7, 2016) at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/reasons‐serial‐subject‐adnan‐syed‐receive‐
trial/story?id=40373228 (explaining the influence of the Serial podcast, as well as the
subsequent Undisclosed podcast that took a “deeper dive” into the case); Amelia
McDonnell‐Parry, ‘Making a Murderer’: What Brendan Dassey Decision Means for Steven
Avery,
ROLLINGSTONE.COM
(August
15,
2016)
at
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/what‐brendan‐dassey‐decision‐means‐for‐
steven‐avery‐w434421 (“[T]here were very few heroes in Making A Murderer’s first season,
and not a single one among the many law enforcement officers who were featured; the
police, forensic experts, prosecutors and, yes, both trial judges earned their fair share of
contempt from viewers. Perhaps Judge Duffin was seizing upon an opportunity to kick off
season two on a more positive note – and with better PR.”).
200

201 Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 637
(2009) (“The empirical record shows that the American system for appealing criminal
convictions regularly fails in its most important role of protecting against erroneous
conviction of the innocent.”).
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C. Procedural Due Process and the Right to a New Trial
The protections offered by a robust application of the thirteenth‐
juror rule suggest that the trial judge’s power to review the weight of the
evidence fits within the constitutional scheme of procedural due process.
It is true that some federal district courts have held that it is not.203 But the
Supreme Court has certainly not foreclosed the possibility that the trial
judge’s review of evidentiary weight is protected by procedural due
process—and, in fact, some of its early authority suggests that the power
to review evidentiary weight is an essential safeguard of the trial
process.204
The Supreme Court’s test for procedural due process requires
conducting “what is in essence a cost‐benefit analysis, weighing the risk
that the plaintiff will be erroneously deprived of liberty against the cost of
providing additional procedures to safeguard against such error.”205 On
the cost side, the Supreme Court held in Mathews v. Eldridge that a court
must consider “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”206 These costs are then
weighed against a litigant’s “private interest that will be affected by the
official action,” along with “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”207

See, e.g., Spence v. Sheets, 675 F. Supp. 2d 792, 802 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (“The Due Process
Clause does not provide relief for defendants whose convictions are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, but only for those who have been convicted without enough proof
to allow a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This language
has been repeated in numerous district court opinions, most from the northern and
southern districts of Ohio.
203
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Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 1313,
1331 (2016).
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Here, the bulk of the costs would be relatively straightforward.
They include the effort that the trial judge puts into reviewing the
evidentiary weight, plus the delay and financial expense caused by the
instances in which the judge orders a new trial on the weight of the
evidence. The litigants’ private interests, of course, are the substantive
rights protected by the judicial system: an interest in liberty and the
avoidance of wrongful imprisonment on the criminal side, and an interest
in civil recourse and corrective justice on the civil side (as well as the
avoidance of wrongful liability). The hard question is to estimate the
value of the new trials resulting for the judge’s ruling—is the value of the
new‐trial safeguard high enough to offset its cost?208
This question goes back to the standard applied for new trials—
just how convinced must the judge be that there was a serious
miscarriage of justice?209 If the standard is merely that the judge disagrees
with the verdict, then it is unlikely that the value of a new trial would
outweigh its cost. After all, if it is simply a matter of reasonable minds
disagreeing, then the outcome of the second trial is unlikely to change.
But if, on the other hand, the trial judge is convinced that the evidence
weighed strongly against the jury’s verdict and that the verdict was
manifestly unjust, then a new trial is likely to be much more valuable. It
may suggest that the evidence, though legally sufficient, was not enough
to give confidence in the verdict. It may also suggest that impermissible
factors such as juror bias played a role in the verdict.
Especially when the judge does not know what led the jury to rule
as it did—and this “invisible error” is information the judge typically
Of course, this analysis is not an either‐or equation; as a federal judge and a legal
scholar have noted in regard to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “we are not to
choose between quality, speed, and cost‐effectiveness. We are to work toward achieving
them all.” Steven S. Gensler & Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Measuring the Quality of Judging: It
All Adds Up to One, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 492 (2014). In criminal cases, in particular,
protecting against wrongful conviction outweighs even substantial costs. See Matthew
Bova, A Sufficiency‐of‐the‐Evidence Exception to the New York Appellate Preservation Rule, 19
CUNY L. REV. 1, 24 (2015) (“Stripped of its underlying justifications, the finality theory
amounts to nothing more than an argument that convicted people should stay
convicted.”).
208
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See supra Part II.A.
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cannot know, given the needs of deliberative privacy—the judge should
be encouraged to exercise broad discretion to order a retrial. In order to
exercise this discretion, the trial judge must be able to weigh the evidence
as a whole, re‐examining questions of credibility, and viewing the
evidence as a neutral observer.210 Of course, the judge’s power is not
unlimited. Importantly, most jurisdictions limit the judge to granting a
single new trial on the weight of the evidence.211 If the judge was right
that invisible error infected the process, then a second jury is unlikely to
return the same verdict—given the safeguards that now exist, it would be
highly unusual for the same bias, misunderstanding, or misconduct to
influence a second verdict.212 If a second jury in fact returns the same
verdict that the judge originally thought weighed strongly against the
evidence, then that is a sign that the judge was more likely to have been
wrong than the jury.213
Perhaps one of the most interesting natural experiments with
weight‐of‐the‐evidence review occurred in Tennessee, which had a long
history of “thirteenth juror” review.214 In 1985, however, the Tennessee
Supreme Court abandoned the practice in criminal cases.215 The Court

210 Robertson, supra note 21, at 210‐17 (recommending unified standards for judicial
review of evidentiary weight in the federal district courts).

Robertson, supra note 21, at 208 (“If a judge could order new trials consecutively until a
jury returns a verdict with which the judge can agree, then it is true that the verdict is
effectively rendered by the judge instead of the jury.”); see also Massey‐Ferguson Credit
Corp. v. Webber, 841 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1988)).
211

212 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (referring to voir dire, juror
observation “by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel,” jurors’ ability to “report
inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict,” and post‐verdict
impeachment not nonjurors).

Robertson, supra note 21, at 208‐9 (“There is a general presumption that if a second jury
agrees with the first, it was the trial judge and not the jury who was mistaken about the
weight of the evidence.”).
213

State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting) (“Under
Tennessee law, the thirteenth juror rule was long seen as the best safeguard against jury
error.”).

214

215 State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1985). The Tennessee Court had earlier
concluded that such review was not required by the United States Constitution. State v.
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explained that it did not see a need for thirteenth‐juror review in criminal
cases, where the high standard of proof combined with legal sufficiency
review already seemed to offer protection enough:
The distinction between the “weight” of the evidence and the
“legal sufficiency” of the evidence has little substance in
criminal cases, where the State has the burden of proving the
defendantʹs guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is difficult to
accept the proposition that a trial judge can reasonably
determine that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but that such a
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. We find the
weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not
impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal
cases.216
Two of the justices on the court joined a dissenting opinion, warning that
the court overlooked important protections offered by the thirteenth‐juror
power. The dissent noted that review for evidentiary weight included
attention to witness credibility and demeanor, and argued that it
provided that it “may be the only safeguard available against a
miscarriage of justice by the jury.”217
It took only six years for the Tennessee Supreme Court to reverse
course and adopt a formal rule reinstating the trial judge’s ability to
review the weight of the evidence.218 An advisory committee charged
with studying the issue had recommended the rule change.219 In 2015, the
Court acknowledged the safeguards offered by the rule and quoted the
earlier dissent with approval and even adding its own emphasis,
adopting the former dissent’s argument that the new‐trial right
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn.1978). In Johnson, the court ruled that it “should not be
reinstated as a part of Tennessee criminal procedure.”
216

Id.

217

Id. (Drowota, J., dissenting).
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State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 121–22 (Tenn. 1995).
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Id.
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performed an important role in safeguarding “against a miscarriage of
justice by the jury.”220
Thus, although courts may express concern that granting a new
trial on the weight of the evidence may “usurp the jury’s role” in fact‐
finding, the judge is actually playing a very different role. The judge is
not acting as a super‐juror, or even as a true “thirteenth juror,” even
though the judge may be making a similar determination about the
credibility of witnesses and the overall weight of the evidence. Instead,
the judge and jury are both given the opportunity to exercise their
complementary strengths: for the jury, this is the power of group decision
making, the greater diversity of its members, and a more accurate
reflection of the community.221 The judge, on the other hand, has greater
experience with a range of cases and an understanding of how the facts
and the law interrelate in the case, giving the judge an intuitive sense of
when the jury might have misunderstood the court’s instructions even
when the judge cannot directly inquire into the basis of the jury’s
decision. Weight‐of‐the‐evidence review protects both of these
complementary roles: the jury is given the independence to allow full,
free, and confidential deliberation, while the judge is permitted to
exercise the discretion gained from experience to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.
V.

CONCLUSION

The trial judge’s authority to order a new trial on the weight of the
evidence is an important, though underappreciated, aspect of the right to
a jury trial. The power to grant a new trial acts as a safeguard against
invisible error—that is, error that arises from improper jury decision
making that hides behind the shroud of deliberative secrecy. Invisible
error can be caused by the jury’s innocent misunderstanding or by more
egregious juror misconduct or undisclosed bias. But in either case, the
220 State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889, 899 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d
412, 415 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting), but with added emphasis).

Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179,
216 (1998).
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attorneys and the court see only the result of the jury’s decision making,
not the erroneous procedure that led to that result.
The possibility of such error, however, is no reason to jettison the
jury altogether. The jury has strengths that cannot be matched by judges
alone, including the power of group decision making, a greater diversity
in its members, and a more accurate reflection of the community. Nor
should the judiciary eliminate the jury’s right to deliberate in secrecy. The
jury process and the power of deliberation work only when jurors are
afforded the privacy and independence to fully air all points of view, free
from harassment or scrutiny.
Instead, courts should recognize review of evidentiary weight as
part of the constitutional guarantee of due process. This view plays to the
traditional strengths of the judicial role: that is, a greater experience with
a range of cases and a better understanding of how the facts and the law
interrelate in the case. Even when the judge cannot identify a particular
process error, the judge may have an intuitive sense that a jury has gone
astray. The judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence thus
complements the jury’s role and protects the integrity of the trial process.
The jury is given the independence to allow full, free, and confidential
deliberation, while the judge is permitted to exercise the discretion gained
from experience to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Even in the era of the
endangered jury and vanishing trial, judges should embrace the power to
order a new trial when justice demands it.
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